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Abstract—Web security is an important approach for most
institutions, organizations and individuals which use or provide
their services through websites. In this study, a systematic and
methodical evaluation of the exposure of web servers and HTTP
security headers to attackers that can cause potential harm was
tested in 240 Mozambican websites. Vulnerabilities related to
HTTP security headers were obtained and the mechanisms which
should be taken to reduce the security risks of the services
available on the websites are presented.
Index Terms—Websites, Web services, Cryptographic proto-
cols, Network security, HTTPS, TLS, Vulnerability
I. INTRODUCTION
Web security is concerned with the technological protection
of all individual participants, as well as consumer organiza-
tions and service providers, on simple websites and in complex
web applications [1]. The concern of web security is among
the everlasting unsolved issues on the Internet suppressing
wider deployment of web-hosted applications for critical tasks.
Increasingly, it is also the part of the Internet that is most
vulnerable to attacks [1]. Initially, the emphasis in this domain
focused on the problem of protecting data and information rep-
resented by it transmitted over web protocols from web servers
to the end users without revealing it to unauthorized third
parties. According to studies [2], the number of companies
and individuals with Internet access is expanding rapidly. As a
result, most institutions and organizations are actively involved
in setting up facilities on the web for providing services.
Worse from a consumer choice point of view, often the use of
these services becomes mandatory for employees, customers
or citizens, often in combination with mobile clients. Examples
include ticketing systems, tax filing and cloud document
management. Yet at the same time, websites and services
embedded therein are often vulnerable to attacks on the
data transmission beyond unavailability and other distortions.
Hence, the demand for secure websites continues to grow and
becomes of interest to all political levels.
In recent years the government of Mozambique has been
emphasizing the integration of ICT in order to improve
communication and the exchange of information in public
and private institutions [3]. According to ITU [4] through a
”Cyberwellness Profile”, in 2016, the Mozambique parliament
have approved the first legislation on electronic transaction bill
that intends to regulate the use of electronic systems in trade,
finance and other areas. The legislation also intends to protect
consumers against cybercrime and electronic frauds.
The goal of this study is to make an analysis of the efforts
of various institutions in implementing security mechanisms
in their websites in the light of this development. Thus, we
have analyzed web server security options, HyperText Trans-
port Protocol (HTTP) security headers used in Mozambican
websites and the mechanisms that should be taken to reduce
security risks of the websites. The purpose of this analysis
is to evaluate how many Mozambican institutions use proper
security mechanisms to protect their consumers while serving
them. On the other hand, we call attention to the importance
of using the security mechanisms and the risks that can be
caused when some mechanisms are not observed. The paper
is divided into five sections. Section II describes the research
approach and how the data were collected. Section III reviews
HTTP security headers and how the web server can be secured.
In Section IV we present discussion of results obtained and
related work. Finally, Section V presents conclusions and
recommendations to all operators of websites in Mozambique.
II. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA COLLECTION
In this section, we discuss the methodology adopted for
this study and the techniques used to identify websites in
Mozambique and for collecting data from the selected set of
websites.
A. Research approach
To achieve our goal, a methodology proposed by [5] was
adapted. This approach is based on vulnerability assessment
which is the evaluation process of finding, numbering and
ordering vulnerabilities or threats to a system. The assessment
determines the exposure of assets to active attackers, but also
higher forces such as natural disasters which could negatively
interfere with the provided services. It assists in determining
the need for protection (asset identification), the degree of pro-
tection against the pressure exploiting the vulnerability (threat
evaluation), the quality of protection mechanisms currently in
place (vulnerability appraisal), and a risk analysis taking the
potential damage into account (risk assessment). The outcome
of any such analysis is a plan on what to change to avoid the
risks (risk mitigation). There are two different vulnerability
assessment techniques [5]: i) vulnerability scanning and, ii)
penetration testing (pentesting). The scanning technique is an
automated software search (scan) through a system, in our
scope a web server, for known weaknesses. The scan creates
a report of the potential vulnerabilities. It thus examines the
currently achievable level of security through a passive method
of testing security controls and is typically performed with
full access privileges from inside the system. Depending on
how it is performed, it may execute alongside the day-to-
day operations without interruption. In contrast, penetration
testing is more intrusive and may exploit actual weaknesses
in vulnerable systems. It cannot be fully automated as the
skills, technical capabilities and malicious creativity of the
person running the test are crucial to the success. Compared
to the scanning approach, pentesters are often located outside
of systems, for instance as hired consultants. Their actions
can furthermore disrupt the system operations and cause
irreversible damage which calls for a controlled approach.
Passive vulnerability assessment (i.e. scanning) was adapted
as main methodology and the desk research methodology was
adapted through online desk research technique as second
methodology to collect published reports [6]. Furthermore, the
chosen research approach includes a choice of processing the
results. In vulnerability assessment, there are two techniques to
choose from: i) Baseline Reporting and ii) Software Program
Development [5]. In baseline reports, the current state of a
system is compared to a well-defined baseline. The value of the
reports is the ability to quickly discover unusual behaviour in
systems which may indicate an attack or a new vulnerability. In
software program development, flaws are minimized through
a security-conscious software development which leads to
secure software being released instead of security patching
after the release. For this study, baseline report was adapted
as assessment technique. The reports are consequently made
available for verification as integral part of the research output.
B. Selected tools and data collection
The identification of vulnerabilities can be performed with
many different tools. Most of them can be used both by
security analysts and by attackers, rendering them into dual-
use software [5]. The dominant tool categories are: i) Port
scanners, ii) Banner grabbing tools, iii) Protocol analyzers,
iv) Vulnerability scanners, and v) Honeypots. Vulnerability
scanners were adapted in this study and the following tools
were used for data collection:
• Nmap: Nmap systematically connects to well-known
ports on all detected hosts on a network with the pur-
pose to collect information about the offered services.
The host detection uses raw Internet protocol packets.
It then parses service fingerprints, compares them to a
database and is thus able to identify software programs
and their versions used to implement the services as well
as operating systems and packet filters deployed on each
host [7].
• sslscan: SSL/TLS-protected services, such as HTTPS,










7 Polical party 3
8 Other organization 17
Total 240
cryptographic ciphers as well as the certificates in use
[8]. The tool stands out by being lean and fast.
• Nikto: Nikto examines the state of a web server. It reports
on expected default files, including known insecure ones,
as well as the software programs and configurations on
each checked server [9]. Thus, in addition to the previous
tools, potential site-specific security vulnerabilities can be
detected which include outdated programs and insecure
configurations.
C. Website selection
In order to identify and collect data from websites for
analysis, the Woorankindex site was used [10], which provides
global statistics about the Internet, such as: top sites, web
servers technical information and local top sites. Also, the
National Government portal was analyzed [11]. The data
has been collecting in February and March 2017. Thus, 240
websites were selected as Mozambique top sites in accordance
with Woorankindex. The websites were organized in 8 cat-
egories: telecommunications, government, academic, banks,
media, companies, political parties and other organizations
(see Table I).
III. BACKGROUND: HTTP SECURITY HEADERS AND
SECURING THE WEB SERVER
This section will focus on the first three potential attack
points, i.e, the machine used to run the client components,
server-side components and the communication that takes
place between client and server side.
A. HTTP security headers
The Client-side security mechanisms, which are presented
via HTTP response headers, are purported to ”compel
browsers to perform specific security functions”, and in turn
protect websites and their users from different types of at-
tacks [12]. We take a look at the HTTP security headers as
recommended by the Open Web Application Security Project
(OWASP) [13]. The following headers can be utilised to
increase the security of websites [14], [15]:
• HTTP cookies: Cookies are small amounts of data stored
on the device of the user by the web browser on request
of the web server depending on the configured browser
policy. They are therefore commonly referred to as web
or browser cookies although the more precise term is
HTTP cookies. The function of cookies is to orrelate
subsequent requests from the same user to a website or
web application, allowing a user to stay logged in or
to maintain the shopping basket on multiple web pages,
for instance. Thus, the use of cookies, specified in RFC
2109 and more recently in RFC 6265, leads to stateful
HTTP sessions with mainly three purposes: session man-
agement (logins, carts), personalization (persistent user
preferences on a website) and user tracking [16]. The
secure use of cookies is therefore paramount to the overall
website security, and how to use cookies correctly is still
being debated in web and security communities [17]. Two
distinct headers exist for this purpose. Secure Cookie:
This attribute tells browser to send the cookie to a server
only over HTTPS connections. If not set, the cookie
will be submitted over any type of connection as the
browser does not know that the cookie is sensitive and
in need of protection [16]. HttpOnly Cookie: Prevents
access to sessions through Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
exploits which is one of the most common attack vectors.
Successful attacks are typically followed by a subsequent
hijacking of the victim’s session. The HttpOnly header
therefore mitigates the attack by preventing access to
cookie values through client-side JavaScript execution.
• X-Frame-Options: The header is designed to mitigate
clickjacking attacks in which users unconsciously follow
links to malicious content. To stop clickjacking, it in-
structs the browser whether a webpage is allowed to be
embedded in a frame or other object on the page. Web-
sites can use the header to ensure that foreign content is
not embedded into ther websites. There are three possible
directives for X-Frame-Options: DENY, SAMEORIGIN
and ALLOW-FROM [url].
• X-XSS-Protection: The header is a vendor-specific fea-
ture of older web browsers which prevents pages from
loading when they recognize XSS attacks, nowadays
largely superseded by Content Security Policy. There are
four options for X-XSS-Protection: Disable XSS filtering
(0), enable XSS filtering (1) in case an XSS attack is
detected, the page will be sanitized by removing the
unsafe parts, enable XSS filtering (1;mode=block) and
enable XSS filtering (1;report=[reporting-URI]) in case
an XSS attack is detected, the violation will be reported
on top of the unsafe parts removal.
• Content Security Policy: As successor to X-XSS-
Protection standardized by the W3C, detects and mit-
igates attacks involving XSS and data injections such
as unauthorized access to data, website defacement or
distribution of maleware. This header is parameterized
with values to restrict the browser in loading additional
resources for any page such as scripts, images, fonts or
media. It can also restrict form submission targets.
• X-Content-Type-Options: This header was introduced
by Microsoft in Internet Explore 8 as a way for web-
masters to block content sniffing that was happening and
could transform non-executable MIME types into exe-
cutable MIME types. There is one value for X-Content-
Type-Options: nosniff, it blocks a request if the requested
type is ”style” and the MIME type is not ”text/css” or
”script” and the MIME type is not a JavaScript MIME
type.
• Strict-Transport-Security: This response header (often
abbreviated as HSTS) is a feature that lets a website tell
browsers that it should only be communicated with using
HTTPS. The effect is that HTTP accesses are forcibly
upgraded to HTTPS. There are three possible directives
for HSTS: max-age=[expire-time], includeSubDomains
and preload. Thus, the HSTS header is ignored by the
browser when a website is accessed using HTTP; this is
because an attacker may intercept HTTP connections and
inject the header or remove it. When a website is properly
accessed over HTTPS, the browser knows that the website
is HTTPS capable and will honor the HSTS header. This
policy protects against two categories of attacks: passive
eavesdropping and active transmission hijacking through
Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks.
B. Securing the web server
As the aim of the research is to convey practical recom-
mendations to website operators, the procedures and tech-
nologies for securing the servers and services will be briefly
presented to ultimately protect consumers and providers of
web applications alike [1]. HTTP was designed in 1991 to
serve HyperText Markup Language (HTML) over the Internet
[18]. However, it evolved since then to support much more
than just static HTML pages. HTTP is used to communicate
between browser clients and web servers, and care must be
taken when considering the data going across the network,
as with plain HTTP, data is not encrypted in any way and
passed across the connection in a human-readable format. To
encrypt the data, its secured variant HTTPS was developed
which is typically served on port 443 instead of 80 for
plain HTTP. Yet, merely offering HTTPS is not sufficient
to increase security. According to [6], the encryption when
using HTTPS is handled transparently, with the client and
server first communicating the TLS handshake. This allows
the protocol to pass data between the two tiers that will be
used for the encryption process, and the most important piece
of data is the server’s X.509 certificate. Certificates are digital
files that contain information about the server machine, and
most importantly contain the server’s public key.
HTTPS is designed to provide strong security. Yet it may
fall short of the specified goals when it is incorrectly imple-
mented in server-side components. A number of security issues
associated with this protocol have been unwrapped over time,
starting from cryptographic limitations and design suboptimal
choices in the TLS protocol, to the insecure deployment
and configuration of HTTPS websites. To configure a secure
HTTPS web server, there are a number of security glitches
to be avoided. The web server administrator must observe the
following security issues:
• Validity period of digital certificate: In accordance with
[19], many Certificate Authorities (CAs) have decided in
2015 to stop the creation of TLS certificates whose valid-
ity interval exceeds 39 months [19], [20]. The rationale
for this change is the sweetspot between high usability
and high connection security. In contrast to previous
certificates with longer intervals, administrators are now
required to review and update their certificates more fre-
quently, thus heuristically minimizing the attack surface
for known vulnerabilities. Security-conscious websites
will most likely aim for even shorter intervals. Wikileaks
certificates, for instance, have a validity of three months,
but in turn require more frequent administrator action.
A remaining issue is that even browser warnings about
outdated certificates are often ignored by users due to
trained indifference [21].
• Trust in CAs: According to [22], trusted CAs are
organizations or companies which issue signed digital
certificates, often for a fee. The responsibilities of these
organizations include identity and background checks on
websites and their owners for which they emit certificates,
setting them apart from unsigned or self-signed ones. A
self-signed certificate, in contrast, would be signed by the
website operators themselves. Self-signed certificates are
not recommended for use by websites because they do
not follow the best practices, may not follow industry
guidelines and have not been audited Yet apart from
commercial CAs [19], community CAs such as CAcert
and Let’s Encrypt continue to increase market share.
• Algorithms: Hash functions are used in many impor-
tant security-critical applications like digital signatures,
timestamps, message authentication codes and authenti-
cation protocols [23]. Attacks against hash functions may
thereby have a large influence on the overall security
of electronic services. Several hash functions such as
MD5 and SHA1 [23]–[26] that are still in use in some
applications today have been successfully attacked in
terms of collisions. A collision attack is an attempt to
find two input strings of a hash function that produce the
same hash result.
C. Implemention of HTTP security headers
This subsection exemplarily provides prescriptive guidance
for establishing a secure configuration posture for the web
servers Apache and Nginx [27], [28] through HTTP security
headers to demonstrate the relative ease of achieving secure
websites. The instructions were tested on Apache httpd 2.2.22
in Ubuntu 12.04.5 and Nginx 1.4.6 in Ubuntu 14.04.5 LTS.
They provide proper mitigation measures to either remove
Table II




HTTP Cookies Apache Header set Set-Cookie
HttpOnly;Secure
Nginx add header Set-Cookie
”HttpOnly;Secure”;
X-Frame-Options Apache Header always append X-
Frame-Options SAMEORI-
GIN
Nginx add header X-Frame-
Options ”SAMEORIGIN”;
X-XSS-Protection Apache Header set X-XSS-
Protection ”1; mode=block”
Nginx add header X-XSS-
Protection ”1; mode=block”;
X-Content-Type-Options Apache Header set X-Content-Type-
Options nosniff
Nginx add header X-Content-Type-
Options nosniff;










Content Security Policy Apache Header set Content-Security-
Policy ”default-src ’self’”
Nginx add header Content-
Security-Policy ”default-src
’self’”;
weaknesses or reduce the risks level. Security vulnerabili-
ties related to HTTP headers can be fixed by implementing
the necessary configuration in the file httpd.conf located in
/etc/apache2/ for Apache and nginx.conf located in /etc/nginx/
for Nginx. Thus, for httpd.conf the Header directive was used
under module [IfModule mod headers.c][/IfModule] while for
nginx.conf the add header directive was used under the http
block. These configuration can also be applied per-site inside
the respective virtual host configurations.Table II shows how
to configure HTTP security headers.
D. Testing HTTP security headers
The technique to test the configuration is the same we apply
to investigate the state of website security in Mozambique. In
this subsection we describe the tests made in our laboratory
environment and results of HTTP headers. For this test, the
Figure 1. The HTTP security headers on Apache
Figure 2. The HTTP security headers on Nginx
Nmap tool and a custom nmap script (http-headers.nse) were
used.
• Testing Apache: Figure 1 presents results obtained
from a local Apache web server. The results indicate
the HTTP security headers configured on the server,
i.e, Secure Cookie, HttpOnly Cookie, X-Frame-Options,
X-XSS-Protection, Content Security Policy, X-Content-
Type-Options and Strict-Transport-Security.
• Testing Nginx: Figure 2 presents the results obtained
from Nginx. The result are equivalent. Thus, both web
servers are adequately configured.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We present results of our evaluation of 240 tested websites
in Mozambique based on the HTTP security headers and
mechanisms used to secure the web server.
A. Results
A total of 240 websites in the ”mz” domain were analyzed
and eight groups were created: i) The Telecommunications
category is constituted of Internet Service Providers and
Mobile Operators, ii) The Government category is constituted
by government websites at different levels, iii) The Academic
category is the set of higher education institution and universi-
ties, iv) Media, this category is constituted by newspaper and
television channel websites, v) Bank, this category presents the
banks, vi) Political party, set of political parties and viii) Other
organizations, for the remainder. The study is based on the
following metrics: Cookie attributes (secure and HttpOnly), X-
Frame-Options, X-XSS-Protection, X-Content-Type-Options,
HSTS, HTTP and HTTPS implementation, trusted certificate,
self-signed certificate, validity period of digital certificate, CA
and signature algorithms.
• HTTPS implementation: As can be seen in Table III,
only 76 websites which represent 32% of 240 of ”mz”
domain websites evaluated are not using HTTPS whereas
164 websites which represent 68% use HTTPS, 15 of
them exclusively.
Table III







1 Telecommunications 3 0 4
2 Government 11 3 20
3 Academic 3 2 14
4 Bank 8 2 6
5 Media 3 0 12
6 Company 44 7 78
7 Polical party 0 0 3
8 Other organization 4 1 12
Total 76 15 149
• Trusted certificate authority and self-signed certificate
per group: Figure 3 shows the percentage of websites
which implement HTTPS per category and per CA. Our
results indicate 83% of the government websites use self-
signed certificates and only 17% use trusted CAs. This
statistic is based on the 164 websites using HTTPS.
• Trusted certificate authority and self-signed certifi-
cate: In total (Figure 4), 78% of the websites are using
trusted CAs and 22% are using self-signed certificates.
• HTTP Strict-Transport-Security: Figure 5 indicates
that 2% of all websites with HTTPS have configured
HSTS, i.e, only 3 websites have implemented Strict-
Transport-Security.
• X-Content-Type-Options, Content Security Policy and
X-Frame-Options: We see also on Figure 5 that 0% of
all websites analyzed which had implemented HTTPS
were configured to make use of X-Content-Type-Options.
The same holds for X-XSS-Protection and X-Frame-
Options, as well as the two cookie-related headers
Figure 3. Websites using trusted CAs and self-signed certificates, across
categories
Figure 4. Websites using trusted CA and self-signed certificate, national
average
Figure 5. HTTP security headers
HttpOnly and Secure Cookie. This surprising result in-
dicates that more recent security measures are not yet
known to administrators of these websites, or are not
required for the type of website.
• Hash Algorithm: Figure 6 shows that old and considered
unsafe hash algorithms [23]–[26] like MD5 and SHA1 are
still used. 4% of all certificates use MD5, and 10% of all
Figure 6. Hash algorithms used in websites













15 % 6 % 42 % 37 %
certificates use SHA1.
• Public key length (in bits): Figure 7 depicts the distribu-
tion of public key length bits and public key type (RSA
and EC algorithm). Again, there is a need to secure. 7%
of RSA algorithms work with 1024 bits which are widely
considered insecure [20], [24]–[26], [29].
• Validity of digital certificates: As Table IV shows, 15%
of certificates analyzed had expired between 2012 and
2016, and an additional 6% had expired between January
and March 2017, the time of the study. In contrast,
42% have their remaining validity between April and
December 2017 and 37% between 2018 and 2046.
• Certificate validity period: Independent of the time
of expiration, another interesting metric is the overall
validity of a certificate. It can be noted on Table V that
Table V
CERTIFICATES VALIDITY
Period (1 to 3
Years)
Period (3 to 10
Years)
Period (10 to 40
Years)
88 % 10 % 2 %
88% of the websites follow the best practices, i.e, digital
certificates have a validity not greater than 3 years and
12% of websites do not follow the best practices by
offering certificates which could be trusted by clients long
after the relevant ciphers may become broken [19], [20].
B. Data discussion
The results of this research show the following HTTP
security headers were related to problems flagged by tools
used in this study. Thus, four vulnerabilities were obtained,
namely: the headers X-XSS-Protection, X-Frame-Options,
Strict-Transport-Security and X-Content-Type-Options which
were missing in configurations of web servers. This means that
most web servers have been configured with default config-
uration, the security misconfiguration and lack of knowledge
about common vulnerabilities. In relation to websites which
use certificate authorities, the results indicate that roughly
four out of five use trusted CAs, yet among government
websites the ratio is reversed. This could signal a relative
low priority of website security in authorities compared to
companies where much more is at stake, including reputation
and business transactions. In relation to maximum certificate
validity our results obtained show that 12% of websites do
not follow the best practices especially concerning digital
certificates, i.e, the digital certificates have a validity greater
than 3 years. This result indicates that the websites are not
audited or the responsible administrators of these websites
have a lack of knowledge of the consequences of certificates
with long periods of validity. It should be noted that the sample
size is rather small and may therefore not be representative,
although the national registrar, the Center of Informatics
of Eduardo Mondlane University (CIUEM) responsible for
most ”mz” domains, does not release any numbers. Future
work will include frequent rescans to track the results and
possible improvements over time. Furthermore, potentially all
Mozambican public IPs obtained through the GeoIP2 country
database will be evaluated, leading to a much greater sample
size.
C. Related work
There are several researches that have been conducted such
as: J. Mtsweni [30] in South Africa with his study titled
”Analyzing the Security Posture of south African Websites”,
Ping Chen et al [31] in China with their study titled ”Security
Analysis of the Chinese Web: How well is it protected” and
Jeremy Clark, C. van Oorschot [32] in Canada with their
study titled ”SSL and HTTPS: Revisiting past challenges
and evaluating certificate trust model enhancements”. In these
researches we evaluated the following cases: the security of
websites based in HTTPS implementation, HTTP security
headers and evaluating certificate trust model as related works.
Furthermore presenting the approaches presented in the related
works, this study was conducted by following all phases
proposed by [5], in this context, after identifying the risks
in websites, we present practical solution, i.e, how to mitigate
these risks by presenting the configurations made in the web
servers (Apache and Nginx) as shown in section III through
subsection C and D. Also according to the desk research
methodology through online desk research technique there
are no similar studies about this approach in Mozambique.
According to [30], most of the 70 South African websites
are vulnerable to common attacks (such as clickjacking and
cross-site scripting) but judging by the Mozambican websites
studied by us the data shows that more than 160 websites, or
around two thirds, are vulnerable to common attacks, which
calls for a more urgent and prioritised tacking of the issue.
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
This section presents conclusions and recommendations
for government through Mozambique National Institute of
Communication (INCM), National Institute of Technologies
and Communication (INTIC) and all owners of websites in
Mozambique.
A. Conclusion
The purpose of this analysis was to evaluate how many
Mozambican institutions use the security mechanisms avail-
able from the web server by implementing HTTP(S) security
headers to provide their services and protect their consumers.
Thus, the following conclusions were obtained:
• None of the websites is configured to use the follow-
ing HTTP security headers: X-Content-Type-Options, X-
XSS-Protection, X-Frame-Options, Secure Cookies and
HttpOnly Cookies;
• Most government’s websites analyzed are using self-
signed certificates without centrally enforced manage-
ment policies and only four government websites use
trusted certificates authorities;
• The results indicate that 2% of websites analyzed which
had implemented HTTPS had configured HTTP Strict-
Transport-Security. This represents only 3 of 164 web-
sites;
• Most self-signed certificates used in websites either have
a maximum certificate validity of greater than 3 years or
with an expired date, leading to insecurity in both cases.
Those results demonstrate a lack of: security monitoring, na-
tional entities responsible for security monitoring and knowl-
edge about web server security and vulnerabilities, and above
all a coherent national strategy related to digital services
including aspects of security.
B. Recommendation
We would like to end this study with recommendations for
mitigating and deterring attacks through security posture and
security strategy. Thus, the following recommendations should
be considered by all owners of websites:
• Regular monitoring of systems and networks through
vulnerability assessment tools to provide valuable infor-
mation regarding the current state of security and their
mitigation;
• Good security requires having a secure configuration
defined and deployed for applications, frameworks, appli-
cation servers, web and database servers, and platforms.
Secure settings should be defined, implemented, and
maintained, because defaults are often insecure [13];
• It is necessary to have regulation to enforce all private and
public organizations implementing security mechanisms
to lower security risks, for the greater benefit of the
society and its future development.
• Thus, looking at future requirements, we recommend the
establishment of a lean regulatory entity which defines a
strategy for website and web applications/cloud applica-
tions security and regularly assesses the state of govern-
ment, business, academic and private websites to achieve
a world-renowned state of secure digital information and
services.
C. Material
We encourage the confirmability of our claims and the
repeatibility of our work by sharing the technical under-
pinnings of the research presented in this paper. The raw
material including the list of websites and their use of HTTP
headers is curated at an Open Science Framework repository
at https://osf.io/35sz8/.
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